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ABSTRACT 
We analyze the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations and action rules 
within an agent-based model populated by heterogeneous, interacting firms. Agents have to cope with a 
complex evolving economy characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change, imperfect 
information and coordination hurdles. In these circumstances, we find that neither individual nor 
macroeconomic dynamics improve when agents replace myopic expectations with less naïve learning 
rules. In fact, more sophisticated, e.g. recursive least squares (RLS) expectations produce less accurate 
individual forecasts and also considerably worsen the performance of the economy. Finally, we experiment 
with agents that adjust simply to technological shocks, and we show that individual and aggregate 
performances dramatically degrade. Our results suggest that fast and frugal robust heuristics are not a 
second-best option: rather they are “rational” in macroeconomic environments with heterogeneous, 
interacting agents and changing “fundamentals”. 
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1 Introduction
In this work we study the individual and macroeconomic impacts of heterogeneous expectations
and action rules on individual performance and macroeconomic dynamics by means of an agent-
based model populated by heterogeneous, interacting firms. Therein, agents have to cope with
an environment characterized by deep uncertainty resulting from technical change, imperfect
information and coordination problems.
Expectations have long been central in macroeconomics, from the seminal distinction between
risk and uncertainty suggested by Knight (1921), to the description of “animal spirits” playing an
important role in generating multiple equilibria and coordination failures in Keynes (1936, 1937),
all the way to the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth, 1961; Lucas and Prescott, 1971).
Note, however, that before the “rational expectations (RE) revolution”, the theory was quite
agnostic about the nature of expectations themselves, their origin and their accuracy. And it was
also quite agnostic about what agents actually do given their expectations. Only with the RE
assumption has (part of) the profession taken expectations to be forward-looking, uniform among
agents (take or leave some noise) and on average “true”. And, correspondingly, the “action” has
been assumed to be “right”, that is the one maximizing some objective, conditional on the true
expectation on the future. Of course the claims on expectation or action are supported neither
by empirical evidence (see e.g. Carroll, 2003; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015; Gennaioli
et al., 2016) nor by experimental studies (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Schweitzer and
Cachon, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; Anufriev and Hommes, 2012). Indeed, “rational” expectations
are not viable, even in principle, in presence of Knightian uncertainty, when there are radical
changes in policies (Stiglitz, 2011, 2016) and structural breaks in the underlying distributions
on which agents form their forecasts (Hendry and Mizon, 2010).1
Tentative ways out have been to develop macroeconomic models with learning (e.g. Evans
and Honkapohja, 2001) and a somewhat parsimonious use of bounded rationality.2 However,
both routes continue to acknowledge Olympic rationality either as something to be learned,
or at the very least as the benchmark against which actual expectations ought to be assessed
out of the “wilderness of bounded rationality” (Sims, 1980). The “behavioral” approach does
introduce meaningful restrictions, but still invokes cognitive limitations, insufficient information,
computing power and time assessed against the yardstick of of “full rationality”. Observed
behaviors would then result from a trade-off between accuracy and effort (a general discussion
is in Kahneman, 2003).3
Here, we explore an alternative route grounded in the seminal contributions of Simon (1955),
March and Simon (1993) and Cyert and March (1992), whereby, first, in complex evolving envi-
ronments, expectations and behaviors cannot be neatly distinguished, and, second, behavioral
patterns are adequately accounted for by heuristics, which under Knightian uncertainty and non-
stationarity of the fundamentals of the economy, may well be ecologically rational (cf. Gigerenzer
1For an assessment of risk vs. some form of uncertainty in an econometric perspective, see also Rossi et al.
(2016).
2Since the Great Recession, an increasing number of bounded-rationality DSGE models have appeared. See
Dilaver et al. (2016) and Fagiolo and Roventini (2016) for surveys from different theoretical perspectives.
3Incidentally, notice that the accuracy-effort trade-off is also present in recent rational-expectations models
with information frictions, see e.g. Mankiw and Reis (2002), Woodford (2003), and Sims (2003).
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and Gaissmaier, 2011; see also Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). A heuristic is “a strategy that ig-
nores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally and/or
accurately than more complex methods”(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, p. 454).4 And in-
deed heuristics match also the so-called “less-is-more” effect, which emerges as a response to
the “bias-variance dilemma”, well known in machine-learning and statistical inference (see e.g.
Geman et al., 1992; Alpaydin, 2004; Hastie et al., 2001). Note that heuristics are not “biases”
yielding suboptimal behaviors (as one would gather from Kahneman, 2003 and from a good deal
of behavioral economics), but might well be robust “locally optimal” strategies that outperform
purported “rational” choices in changing worlds characterized by substantive and procedural
uncertainty (Dosi and Egidi, 1991).
In this work, we investigate the validity of such alternative views by studying individual
and aggregate performances of different rules of expectation formation and behavior elicitation
in an agent-based framework. Agent-based models (ABM) represent the economy as a com-
plex, evolving system populated by heterogeneous, interacting agents (Tesfatsion and Judd,
2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008; Farmer and Foley, 2009; Kirman, 2010; Dosi, 2012).5 More
specifically, we extend the Keynes + Schumpeter (K+S) model (Dosi et al., 2010, 2013, 2015,
2016a,b) to account for heterogeneous expectation rules and adaptive learning. The K+S model
is a bridge between Keynesian theories of demand generation and Schumpeterian theories of
innovation and economic growth, with “Minskian” financial dynamics (Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1993). In that, it represents an economy characterized by endogenous and persistent novelty,
imperfect information, where Knightian uncertainty is pervasive and coordination failures are
the norm. As imperfect information is ubiquitous, the economy is never in a Pareto equilib-
rium (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) and agents’ behaviors are conditioned by future constraints
(Neary and Stiglitz, 1983). The microeconomic foundations of the model are genuinely “behav-
ioral” (Akerlof, 2002): heterogeneous firms and banks behave in tune with what we know from
micro-empirical evidence, and they interact without resorting to any ex-ante commitment to the
reciprocal consistency of their actions, thus implicitly addressing the call by Solow (2008) for
genuine micro-heterogeneity.
Naturally, the very nature of the K+S model rules out the existence of a rational-expectation
equilibrium on which fictitious representative agents can coordinate (Kirman, 1992, 2014). Still,
we can compare the impact of heterogeneous, more or less “sophisticated”, expectations and
learning rules on agents’ performance, as well as on macroeconomic dynamics. In that, we also
address the tension between interpretations based on “biases” and effort/accuracy trade-offs
(in tune with behavioral economics) vis-a`-vis the hypothesis of ecological rationality of simple
heuristics (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002). In addition, we evaluate
the robustness of our results to alternative heuristic-based rules.
We begin by introducing in the K+S model five expectation rules (based on the experimental
findings of Anufriev and Hommes, 2012),6 allowing firms to switch among them according to their
4 Among a vast literature, see also Gigerenzer and Todd (1999); Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009); Gigerenzer
and Selten (2002); Bro¨der (2003).
5The literature on agent-based macroeconomics has been blossoming in the last years, see e.g. Fagiolo and
Roventini (2012, 2016) for recent surveys. See also Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion (2015); Salle (2015) for two recent
works investigating non-RE rules in agent-based frameworks.
6See also Hommes, 2011; Assenza et al., 2014b; Colasante et al., 2015.
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past forecasting performance (Brock and Hommes, 1997). In such a framework, expectations
are thus heterogeneous and evolve over time (in line with the empirical evidence in Coibion
et al., 2015). We then allow agents to learn by employing more “sophisticated” expectations
grounded on recursive least squares (RLS, see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001), and compare
the individual and system-level performances.
Simulation results show that in line with the K+S tradition, the model can account for en-
dogenous growth and business cycles, where mild fluctuations are punctuated by deep downturns
(Fagiolo et al., 2008; Stiglitz, 2011, 2016; Ascari et al., 2015), as well as for a wide ensemble of
macro and micro empirical regularities (Dosi et al., 2016a). Moreover, we find that compared
to simple (benchmark) myopic expectations, somewhat more complex alternatives increase the
forecast errors of the agents and do not substantially improve the performance of the system
(see also Dosi et al., 2006). Altogether, our results suggest that expectations have a limited im-
pact on the dynamics of economies, which are mainly driven by the income constraints affecting
agents’ choices.
However, both individual and aggregate performance considerably deteriorate when firms
abandon “fast and frugal” heuristics and start estimating their future demand via recursive
least squares. This is explained by the fact that the forecasting performance of RLS-learning
agents — as revealed by their mean squared forecast errors — turns out to be extremely puny
in a non-linear environment with Knightian uncertainty. In turn, the errors of RLS agents are
amplified by the positive feedbacks introduced by income constraints in the model. This sinks
both the short- and long-run performances of the economy, increasing the volatility of business
cycles, the unemployment rate, while reducing the growth potential of the economic system.
Moreover, and not surprisingly, we find that whenever agents are allowed to choose between
RLS-learning and simple invariant rules, they “rationally” adopt the latter.
Our results bring support to the ecological rationality of heuristics: in complex, evolving
economies characterized by pervasive uncertainty and perpetual structural change, heuristics
are not a second-best option, but they provide a more accurate and robust tool for inference
and action than more sophisticated forecasting techniques. In turn, macroeconomic models
with heterogeneous, interacting agents ought to feature robust heuristic-driven expectations and
behaviors, because both this is actually observed and they are the most accurate forecasting
tool that agents can count on. Notice that the Keynesian nature of heuristics have nothing to
do with the purported “frictions” or “rigidities” in the economy. Rather, they are an essential
feature of decentralized economies painstakingly coordinating at varying levels of activity. If
agents neglect them, they do it at their own peril: we show indeed that both individual and
collective performances degrade.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the impact of ex-
pectations and agents’ interactions on macroeconomic dynamics. In Section 3, we describe the
K+S model. We then empirically validate it in Section 4. The impact of heterogeneous ex-
pectation rules is studied in Section 5, while learning is introduced in Section 6 and is further
investigated in Section 7. In Section 8 we experiment with agents who are like good mainstream
economists, i.e. supply-siders responding just to technology shocks. Section 9 discusses in gen-
eral the properties of heuristic-driven decisions. Finally, our concluding remarks are in Section
4
10.
2 Expectations, interactions and macroeconomic dynamics: the
general problem
In the most general terms, the dynamics of any economy can be seen as an enormously high-
dimensional system of difference equations. They describe the “laws of motion” of the system
itself and of its multiple constituent agents, driven by the behavioral (and, relatedly, expec-
tational) adjustments of the agents themselves, their interactions, and some (endogenous or
exogenous) shocks. In such a “meta-model”, agents’ individual outcomes depend on i) their
expectations based on both their individual and the aggregate histories, ii) their individual
histories, iii) the aggregate history, and iv) the individual and aggregate shocks:
x(t) = F
(
f
[
(x(t− 1), . . . ,x(t− τ);X(t− 1), . . . , X(t− τ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Individual expectations
; (1)
x(t− 1), . . . ,x(t− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Individual histories
;X(t− 1), . . . , X(t− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate history
; (t), ε(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Shocks
;
)
,
where x(t) = [x1(t), . . . , xn(t)]
ᵀ is a matrix comprising the state variables for all heterogenous
i = 1, . . . , n agents populating the economy (e.g. capital stocks, net worths, sales, prices, etc.),
X(t) is the vector of macroeconomic state variables (e.g. GDP, investment, unemployment
rate, etc.); f(t) = [f1(t), . . . , fn(t)]
ᵀ is a vector of individual expectation functions which map
the individual and system-level histories into forecasts and actions by the agents (i.e. the
determination of their “control” variables); and finally (t) = [1(t), . . . , n(t)]
ᵀ is the vector of
idiosyncratic shocks hitting agents (e.g. their productivity), while ε(t) are system-wide shocks
(affecting e.g. the technological frontier of the economy).
In turn, macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. GDP, total investment...) are either obtained from
the aggregation over microeconomic variables or are system-level variables (e.g. inflation, interest
rate) determined from microeconomic elements or from other macroeconomic indicators. Note
that agents’ interactions impact both their state variables as well as the emerging macroeconomic
outcomes. And there is also a feedback loop from the macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. demand
dynamics, inflation) to agents’ forecasts and decisions. In such a framework, agents ought to
form their expectations based on the observation of the past, i.e. they are extrapolative, adaptive
agents.
Clearly, put that way, there is hardly any way to identify equilibria or dynamical paths
of such a system, whose complexity stems from the sheer interdependence among a multitude
of heterogenous agents (firms, households, workers, banks). Even neglecting the possibility of
changing fundamentals of the economy (due to e.g. technological change), interactions generi-
cally entail endemic externalities and non-linearities. And with that come unimmaginably high
informational demands on the decision-makers.
Facing all this, the prevailing response of macroeconomic theory, as well known, has been
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to eliminate complexity at its roots by eradicating interaction altogether and assuming a repre-
sentative agent of some kind. The radical fallacies of such a reduction have been conclusively
argued in Kirman (1992, 2014) at the level of theory, and by Forni and Lippi (1997, 1999) at
the level of econometric aggregation.
However, let us leave also all this aside. Now, assuming a representative-agent economy, one
does not have to cope with the problem of aggregation, macroeconomics shrinks to microeco-
nomics and we have a much lower dimensional system of the form:
X(t) = F
(
f
[
X(t− 1), . . . , X(t− τ)
]
;X(t− 1), . . . , X(t− τ); ε(t)
)
. (2)
where the aggregate state variables only depend on the aggregate expectation, the aggregate
history and the aggregate shocks. This representation still remains too broad in order to get
any full (equilibrium) “antropomorphisation” of the observed dynamics. One at the very least
requires the linearization of the F (. . .) function and, further, the assumption that the “law of
motion” of the system is not influenced by (possibly out-of-equilibrium) expectations of the
representative agent – who is now, basically, the Central Planner of the economy. This is akin
to the basic sketch of e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (1999), where the reduced-form model is a
vector of endogenous variables (X), depending on their lagged values, on expectations of next
period’s values, f [X], and on a vector of exogenous shocks ε
One of the bottom lines of a good deal of the last seventy years of macroeconomics concerns
precisely the determination of expectations. We know the story. Even accepting the interpreta-
tive legitimacy of the reduction of eq. 1 to eq. 2, the so-called “rational expectation (RE) revo-
lution” further suggests that actual expectations correspond to the “true” statistical conditional
expectations. In a nutshell, the forward-looking representative agent — as the macroeconomic
theorists — know the “true” model of the economy, f
[
X(t − 1), . . . , X(t − τ)
]
= E
[
X(t + 1)
]
and the system further simplifies to:
X(t) = F
(
E
[
X(t+ 1)
]
;X(t− 1), . . . , X(t− τ); ε(t)
)
. (3)
However, even in this reductionist framework, there can be multiple stationary RE equilibria:
self-fulfilling expectations can affect the optimal choice of the representative agent and sunspots
can arise (among a vast literature, see the seminal contribution of Woodford, 1990 and the
survey in Benhabib and Farmer, 1999).
Given such a multiplicity of RE equilibria, the natural natural question is then “where do
these expectations come from”? Short of some divine revelation they ought to be plausibly
learned. But the literature on learning RE is a very mixed bag, basically ridden of some superfi-
cially corroborating models, among which stand out “wrong” learning models, such as OLS, that
however may lead to the selection of supposedly “right” outcomes – i.e. some RE equilibria.7
At best the results are fragile, even neglecting their econometric inconsistency vis-a`-vis any
structural break affecting the stochastic process governing the dynamics of the economy. Indeed,
as shown by Hendry and Mizon (2010), in such a framework the conditional expectations used
by the agents in RE models are neither unbiased nor minimum mean squared error predictors.
7Within a wide literature, see Bray (1982), Bray and Kreps (1987), Marcet and Sargent (1988), and the
discussions in Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001).
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In a nutshell, “it is not rational to have rational expectations” (Kirman, 2016, p. 8).
And equally important, the basic theoretical thrust of all, the foregoing stream of theoretical
analyses goes against (the little) we know about actual expectation formation by actual economic
agents. For instance, using the survey of professional forecasters, Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2012, 2015) reject the RE hypothesis. Similarly, employing survey data on the investment plans
of the chief financial officers of large U.S. corporations, Gennaioli et al. (2016) find evidence
against the RE benchmark, while supporting extrapolative expectations. Finally, the recent
evidence stemming from learning-to forecast laboratory experiments show robust and persistent
deviations from rational expectations (see e.g. Anufriev and Hommes, 2012; Assenza et al.,
2014a).
In the following, we mean to explore a radically alternative route. On the side of the
system dynamics, we intend to maintain the complexity of the evolving systems as sketched
in the “meta-model” of eq. (1). At the same time, we intend to explore the conjecture that
the (sometimes) orderly system-level properties are not the outcome of utterly sophisticated
individual forward-looking behaviors, but rather an emergent collective property of relatively
simple, inertial behaviors whereby agents learn how to repeatedly swim in an Heraclitus’ river
in which one is literally unable to ever step in twice.8
3 The expectation-enhanced K+S model
This work extends the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) family of models (Dosi et al., 2010, 2013,
2015, 2016a,b) by introducing different expectation formation rules. The barebone structure of
the model is portrayed in Figure 1.
The economy is composed of F1 capital-good firms (labelled with index i), F2 consumption-
good firms (denoted by the index j), LS consumers/workers, B commercial banks (denoted
by the index k), a Central Bank and the Government sector. Capital-good firms invest in
R&D to increase the productivity of their heterogeneous machine-tools (with product inno-
vation/imitation) and their own production techniques (with process innovation/imitation).
Consumption-good firms combine machines bought from capital-good firms and labor in order to
produce a homogeneous product for consumers. The banks provide credit to consumption-good
firms and buy Government bonds. The public sector levies taxes on firms’ and banks’ profits, it
pays unemployment benefits and bails banks out in case of banking crises. The Government can
run deficits by issuing bonds, which are bought by the banking sector. Finally, the Central Bank
fixes the baseline interest rate in the economy and the macroprudential regulatory framework.
Let us now sketch the main characteristics and dynamics of the expectation-enhanced K+S
model. A detailed description of the model is provided in Appendix B and in Dosi et al. (2015,
2016a).
8Our work has some (superficial) point of contact with an increasing stream of research which introduce infor-
mation frictions in rational expectation models. For instance, Mankiw and Reis (2002) assume that information
are sticky and agents update them infrequently, while Sims (2003) and Woodford (2003) build noisy-information
models, where agents continuously update their beliefs facing a signal extraction problems. However, differently
from us, such works assume a fully rational agent and do not account for the “deep” Knigthian uncertainty and
possible coordination failures occurring in presence of multiple heterogenous interacting agents.
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Figure 1: The structure of the Keynes+Schumpeter model.
3.1 The timeline of events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic decisions take place in sequential
order:
1. Policy variables (e.g. capital requirement, tax rate, Central Bank interest rate, etc.) are
fixed.
2. Banks determine the potential supply of credit.
3. Capital-good firms perform R&D, trying to discover new products and more efficient pro-
duction techniques and to imitate their competitors.
4. Consumption-good firms decide how much to produce and invest according to different
expectation rules. They apply for bank credit (and may be rationed) if their internal
funds are not enough.
5. The capital-good market opens. Given the presence of imperfect information, capital-good
firms signal their products to an evolving subset of consumption-good firms, which in turn
choose their supplier.
6. Firms in both industries hire workers according to their production plans and start pro-
ducing.
7. The imperfectly competitive consumption-good market opens. Pervasive imperfect infor-
mation implies that the market shares of firms evolve according to their price competitive-
ness.
8. The firms in both sectors compute their profits and pay back their bank loans.
8
9. Entry and exit take place. In both sectors, firms with near zero market shares or negative
net liquid assets are eschewed from the two industries and replaced by new ones.
10. Banks compute their profits and net worth. If the latter is negative they fail and are bailed
out by the Government.
11. The Government computes its surplus or deficit, the latter being financed by sovereign
debt.
12. Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered and become part of the
capital stock at time t+ 1.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP, investment, employment) are
computed, summing over the corresponding microeconomic variables. As its direct ancestor
(Dosi et al., 2015), the model is stock-flow consistent.
3.2 The capital- and consumption-good sectors
In both capital- and consumption good markets, information are imperfect and firms’ price are
heterogeneous. As a consequence, the economy is never in a constrained Pareto state (Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 1986) and the current behavior of firms is conditioned by various constraints (Neary
and Stiglitz, 1983).
The capital-good industry is the locus of endogenous machine-embodied innovation. The
current technology mastered by a capital-good firm is defined by Ai, the labour productivity
of the machine it sells to the downstream sector, and by Bi, the efficiency of its production
technique. Capital-good firms develop new technologies or imitate the ones of their competitors
in order to produce and sell more productive and cheaper machines that are in turn supplied
to consumption-good firms. Capital-good firms invest a fraction of their past sales in R&D in
order to discover new machines (INi) or copy existing ones. The innovation process has two
steps: first a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter θini (t) = 1− e−ζ1INi(t)
determines whether firm i innovates or not. Therefore the frequency of innovations (whether
successful or not) depends on ζ1 6 1, the firms’ search capabilities, and the specific amount of
R&D they have invested. If an innovation occurs, the firm obtains a new technology, whose
labor productivity levels are given by Aini (t) = Ai(t)(1 + x
A
i (t)) and B
in
i (t) = Bi(t)(1 + x
B
i (t)),
where xAi and x
B
i are two independent draws from a Beta(α1, β1) distribution.
9 Therefore α1
and β1 define the extent of technological opportunities available to firms, i.e. the magnitude of
the innovation leaps. Capital-good firms produce employing only labor and set prices with a
fixed mark-up over unit costs of production.
In the consumption-good industry, firms produce a homogeneous consumption good employ-
ing capital (composed of different vintages of machines) and labor under constant returns to
scale. Desired production is fixed according to different adaptive demand expectations (Dej ):
Dej (t) = f(Dj(t− 1), Dj(t− 2), Dej (t− 1), Y (t− 1)), (4)
9The draws xAi (t) and x
B
i (t) may well be negative (i.e. the innovation fails) in that case the firm continues to
offer the “old” machine.
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where Dj is firm’s demand and Y is the gross domestic product. The detailed characterization
of firms’ expectation formation and dynamics is discussed below (section 3.3).
Desired production (Qdj ) is then defined based on expected demand and desired inventories
(N ej ):
Qdj (t) = D
e
j (t) +N
e
j (t), (5)
with N ej (t) = N
d
j (t) − Nj(t − 1) and Ndj (t) = ιDej (t), ι ∈ [0; 1]. Given the actual stock of
inventories, if the capital stock constrains the production plans of the firm, it invests in new
machines in order to expand its production capacity. Thus firms’ investment choices are affected
by their demand expectations (see on recent evidence Gennaioli et al., 2016).10 Moreover, firms
also invest to acquire state-of-the-art technologies: they replace old and obsolete machines with
new ones according to a payback period rule (Dosi et al., 2010).
The capital-good market is characterized by imperfect information and “Schumpeterian”
competition (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Upstream firms signal the price and productivity of
their machines to their current customers as well as to a set of potential new ones. Consumption-
good firms choose their supplier comparing the price and the production costs entailed by the
subset of machines they are aware of.
As we mentioned above, demand expectations play a key role in determining the desired
production and investment plans of the firms. At the same time, their actual levels may differ
from the desired ones, as firms can face constraints in the availability of external financing.
More precisely, in the model, consumption-good firms have to advance worker wages as well
as pay the machines they ordered. Thus they may need external financing. As we assume
that capital markets are imperfect (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993;
Hubbard, 1998), internal and external sources of finance are imperfect substitutes. To fund their
production and investment plans, firms first use their stock of liquid assets, and then they ask
credit to banks. Firms pay an interest rate on their loans, which depends on the Central Bank
interest rate (r), as well as on their credit rating. However, if banks are unwilling to provide
loans, firms can end up being credit constrained. In that case, they first cut their investment
and then downscale their production plans. Imperfect capital markets and the possibility of
credit rationing represent a first important source of income constraints in our model, which
contributes to make it different from models where allocative considerations drive the dynamics.
Imperfect information is pervasive also in the consumption-good market (see Rotemberg,
2008, for a survey on consumers’ imperfect price knowledge). As a consequence, consumers
cannot instantaneously switch to the most competitive producer even if the good is homogeneous.
Consumption-good firms fix their prices applying a variable idiosyncratic mark-up on their
production costs. Such costs are given by the ratio between the nominal wage (w) and the average
labor productivity resulting from the machines employed in the production process. Mark-up
dynamics are driven by the evolution of firms’ market shares (in line with “customer market”
10 It is important to emphasize that individual agents form expectations on the state variables which are going
to affect their performance (e.g. their demand), and building on such expectations, they determine their control
variables, e.g. planned production and investments, in a genuine “Keynesian” perspective. Conversely, they do
not care about system-level variables which might have the outmost importance for the modeler, but exert only a
very indirect influence on individual agents (e.g. economy-wide levels of productivity). The two types of forecasts,
unfortunately, get confounded when one assumes the representative agent, who is also the Central Planner, who
is also the modeler...
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models originally described by Phelps and Winter, 1970): firms increase their margins whenever
their market share is expanding. In turn, market shares evolve according to a “quasi replicator”
dynamics: more competitive firms expand while firms with a relatively lower competitiveness
level shrink (see Eqs. 29-31, Appendix B).11
At the end of every period, capital- and consumption-good firms compute their profits,
pay taxes, and update their stock of liquid assets. If the latter is positive, they increase their
bank deposits (consumption-good firms repay their debt first). If a firm’s stock of liquid assets
is negative or if its market share shrinks to zero, then the firm goes bankrupt and exits the
market. As we assume that the number of firms is fixed over time, each dead firm is replaced
by a new entrant.12
3.3 An ecology of expectation heuristics
In presence of imperfect information (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986) and deeply uncertain en-
vironments (Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1937), we assume that agents follow behavioral rules, or
heuristics to form their demand expectations. More specifically, in line with the experimen-
tal evidence provided by Anufriev and Hommes (2012), firms can choose among the following
repertoire of different rules.13
First, firms may follow na¨ıve demand expectations (NA), according to which the past is the
best proxy for the future:
Dena,j(t) = Dj(t− 1). (6)
This is the common expectation assumption in the K+S model (Dosi et al., 2010, 2013, 2015)
and it represents our benchmark case.
Second, under adaptive expectations (ADA), firms correct for their past demand forecast mis-
takes:
Deada,j(t) = D
e
j (t− 1) + ωada(Dj(t− 1)−Dej (t− 1)), (7)
with ωada = 0.65.
Third, in the weak (WTR) and strong (STR) trend expectation rules, firms behave like “chartist”
traders (see Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Anufriev and Hommes, 2012), trying to ride demand
patterns:
Dewtr,j(t) = Dj(t− 1) + ωwtr(Dj(t− 1)−Dj(t− 2)); (8)
Destr,j(t) = Dj(t− 1) + ωstr(Dj(t− 1)−Dj(t− 2)). (9)
The only difference between the WTR and STR expectation rules is the value of the parameter
weighing past demand changes, i.e. ωwtr = 0.4 and ωstr = 1.3.
Finally, firms may react to both their past demand dynamics and to some aggregate “anchor”,
the GDP. The “anchor and adjustment” expectation rule (AA, see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)
11The competitiveness of firms depends on price as well as on unfilled demand.
12Furthermore, in line with the empirical literature on firm entry (Caves, 1998), we assume that entrants are
on average smaller than incumbents, with the stock of capital of new consumption-good firms and the stock of
liquid assets of entrants in both sectors being a fraction of the average stocks of the incumbents.
13See also Dosi et al., 2006; Hommes, 2011; Assenza et al., 2014b; Colasante et al., 2015. Coibion et al. (2015)
find empirical evidence supporting heterogeneity of beliefs among firms.
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is thus:
Deaa,j(t) = [1 + waa∆GDP (t− 1) + (1− ωaa)∆Dj(t− 1)]Dj(t− 1), (10)
with ωaa = 0.5. The value of the parameters of the expectation rules are calibrated according
to the evidence provided by Hommes (2011) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012).
Expectations are heterogeneous and evolve over time (Brock and Hommes, 1997; Hommes,
2011; Anufriev and Hommes, 2012) and are selected by agents on the basis of their predictive
performance. Starting from a uniform distribution of the five expectation rules described above,
firms switch across heuristics according to their past performance.14 Notice that firms have
indeed strong incentives to forecast future demand correctly so as to avoid costly accumulation
of inventories (as in Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000) or conversely to avoid missing sales and profit
opportunities.15
Following Brock and Hommes (1997), Hommes (2011), and Anufriev and Hommes (2012),
and in line with the experimental evidence in Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), firms update
the performance (U) of each heuristic h ∈ {na, ada,wtr, str, aa} according to the last demand
forecast error:
Uh,j(t) = −
(
Dj(t− 1)−Deh,j(t− 1)
Deh,j(t− 1)
)2
+ ηUh,j(t− 1), (11)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is a memory parameter measuring the relative weight attributed by agents to
past errors. Firms adopt a given expectation rule with a probability nh,j(t), which is updated
in each period as follows:
nh,j(t) = δnh,j(t− 1) + (1− δ)exp(βUh,j(t))
Zj(t)
, (12)
with 0 ≤ β, δ ≤ 1, and Zj(t) =
∑H
h=1 exp(βUh,j(t)) being a normalization factor. The parameter
δ captures the persistence or inertia of expectation-formation rules, while the parameter β
measures the intensity of choice, i.e. how fast firms switch to more successful expectation
rules.16
In the simulation exercises performed in Section 6, we will also experiment with enhanced
degrees of “rationality” and introduce learning. More specifically, firms will behave as econo-
metricians, estimating the parameters of the expectation rules via recursive least squares (RLS,
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
3.4 The banking sector
In the model, money is endogenous as its supply depends on the lending activity of banks (among
a vast body of literature, see e.g. Godley and Lavoie, 2007; McLeay et al., 2014). Commercial
banks gather deposits and provide credit to firms. The number of banks is fixed.17
14Entrant firms copy the expectation rule of an incumbent and their probability to adopt any one of them is
proportional to its diffusion in the system. Simulation results presented in Section 5 are robust to the assumption
that the entrants start with a uniform distribution of expectation rules.
15The effects of the two types of forecasting errors are indeed roughly symmetric.
16The values of the β and δ parameters are calibrated according to the values provided by Anufriev and
Hommes (2012).
17For simplicity, we assume that the network linking firms and banks is also fixed over time and the bank-firm
relationship holds both for deposits and credit. Following the empirical evidence on the skewness of the bank size
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Banks’ supply of credit is a function of their equity and is constrained by capital adequacy
requirements inspired by Basel-framework rules (see e.g. Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Ashraf et al.,
2017; Raberto et al., 2012; Popoyan et al., 2017). Moreover, banks maintain a buffer over
the mandatory level of capital, whose magnitude is intentionally altered over the business cycle
according to their financial fragility (Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Becker and Ivashina, 2014),
proxied by the ratio between accumulated bad debt (i.e. loans in default) and bank assets
(Adrian and Shin, 2010). Credit supply is thus influenced by changes in a bank’s balance sheet,
which itself is affected by bank profits net of loan losses. This creates a positive feedback loop
from loan losses to changes in banks’ equity, with a consequent reduction in the amount of credit
supplied to firms in the next period.
Credit demand stems from consumption-good firms’ financing needs for investment and
production, net of their internal funds (see Section 3.2 above). Banks allocate credit among
their clients by ranking the applicants in terms of their creditworthiness, defined by the ratio
between past net worth and sales. Banks provide credit up to their credit supply ceiling. Credit
rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) is an emergent property of the model: firms’ ability to obtain
credit depends on their financial status, but also on the financial fragility of their bank (see also
Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003).
Banks fix the interest rate on loans applying a mark-up on the Central Bank interest rate
(r), which is set in each period according to a Taylor rule (Howitt, 1992; Taylor, 1993):
r(t) = rT + γpi(pi(t)− piT ), (13)
where γpi > 1, pi
T and rT are the target inflation and interest rates, and pi(t) is the inflation rate
of the period. Banks’ loan rates are changing over time, but they are also heterogeneous across
borrowers, as they incorporate a spread linked to firms’ idiosyncratic credit risk.
Banks experience loan losses whenever one of their clients goes bankrupt and exits the
market. Loan losses represent an (endogenous) negative shock to bank profits, which may
become negative. If the net worth of the bank is not sufficient to cover such losses, the bank
goes bankrupt. Whenever a bank fails, the Government steps in and bails it out providing fresh
capital.
3.5 The labor market, consumption and the government sector
The labor market does not feature any imposed clearing condition. The labor supply LS is fixed
and inelastic to the wage rate (w), which is determined by institutional and market factors.18
As a consequence, both involuntary unemployment and labor rationing may emerge. Wage
dynamics depend on the gap between actual and targeted inflation, and on the dynamics of
average productivity and of the unemployment rate:
∆w(t)
w(t− 1) = pi
T + ψ1(pi(t− 1)− piT ) + ψ2 ∆AB(t)
AB(t− 1) − ψ3
∆U(t)
U(t− 1) , (14)
distribution (Berger et al., 1995; Ennis, 2001), banks are assumed heterogeneous in their number of clients, which
are drawn from a Pareto distribution.
18A detailed microfoundation of the labor market in the K+S models is provided in Dosi et al. (2016d,c).
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where AB is the average labor productivity, U the unemployment rate, and ψ1,2,3 > 0.
Unemployed workers receive a subsidy (wu) which is a fraction of the current wage, i.e.
wu(t) = ϕw(t), with ϕ ∈ [0, 1]. Given the total labor demand LD, the total amount of unem-
ployment subsidies to be paid by the Government (G) is:
G(t) = max{wu(t)(LS − LD(t)), 0}. (15)
We assume that workers fully consume their income (which is equivalent to assuming that
workers are credit constrained and therefore cannot engage in standard consumption smooth-
ing),19 while capitalists do not, but only save and invest. Accordingly, aggregate consumption
(C) depends on the income of both employed and unemployed workers:
C(t) = w(t)LD(t) +G(t). (16)
The tight relation between the dynamics of consumption and income is the second main source
of income constraints in our model (the other one being the effect of credit constraints of firms’
investments, see Section 3.2). Notice that also in this respect our model is very different from
other macro-models (e.g. DSGE ones), where consumption is instead determined by an inter-
temporal allocative decision driven by the difference between the interest and inter-temporal
discount rates.
Taxes on profits paid by firms and banks are gathered by the Government at the fixed tax
rate tr. Public expenditures are composed of the cost of public debt (Debtcost), of bank bailouts
(Gbailout) and the unemployment subsidies (G). Public deficit (or surplus) is then equal to:
Def(t) = Debtcost(t) +Gbailout(t) +G(t)− Tax(t). (17)
In case of public deficit, the Government has to issue new bonds, which are bought by banks
according to their share in the total supply of credit.20 If the demand for bonds from the
Government is higher than what banks are able to buy, the Central Bank steps in and buys the
remaining debt.21 If Def(t) < 0, the Government uses the surplus to repay its debt.
To repeat, the explicit microfoundation of the dynamics for all aggregate variables of inter-
est (e.g. output, investment, employment, etc.) is nested in the decisions of a multiplicity of
heterogeneous, adaptive agents and in their interaction mechanisms (see the meta-model rep-
resentation of eq. 1). The model satisfies the standard national account identities: the sum
of value added of capital- and consumption goods firms (GDP ) equals their aggregate produc-
tion. Total production in turn coincides with the sum of aggregate consumption, investment
19The above assumption is also in line with the microeconomic empirical evidence suggesting that the con-
sumption of most households tracks their income as their wealth is close to zero (see e.g. Wolff, 1998). Notice
that the conclusions of the paper qualitatively hold as long as, in good Keynesian fashions (see e.g. Kaldor, 1955),
the propensity to consume out of profits is lower than that out of wages.
20Sovereign bonds are endogenously supplied by the Government according to its deficit, while banks’ demand
for bonds is accommodating supply, in the spirit of e.g. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). Banks buy
Government bonds employing only their net profits.
21As the model has been designed to account for both small fluctuations and large crises, we think that it is
reasonable and in line with the current practices (see e.g. Bernanke, 2011) to let the Central Bank buy sovereign
bonds, especially when banking crises force the Government to bailout banks, considerably increasing the public
debt.
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Stylized facts Empirical studies (among others)
Macroeconomic stylized facts
SF1 Endogenous self-sustained growth with Burns and Mitchell (1946); Kuznets and Murphy (1966);
persistent fluctuations Zarnowitz (1985); Stock and Watson (1999)
SF2 Fat-tailed GDP growth-rate distribution Fagiolo et al. (2008)
SF3 Recession duration exponentially distributed Ausloos et al. (2004); Wright (2005)
SF4 Relative volatility of GDP, consumption Stock and Watson (1999); Napoletano et al. (2006)
and investment
SF5 Cross-correlations of macro variables Stock and Watson (1999); Napoletano et al. (2006)
SF6 Pro-cyclical aggregate R&D investment Walde and Woitek (2004)
SF7 Cross-correlations of credit-related variables Lown and Morgan (2006); Leary (2009)
SF8 Cross-correlation between firm debt and loan losses Mendoza and Terrones (2014); Foos et al. (2010)
SF9 Banking crises duration is right skewed Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
SF10 Fiscal costs of banking crises to GDP Laeven and Valencia (2008)
distribution is fat-tailed
Microeconomic stylized facts
SF11 Firm (log) size distribution is right-skewed Dosi (2007)
SF12 Fat-tailed firm growth-rate distribution Bottazzi and Secchi (2003, 2006)
SF13 Productivity heterogeneity across firms Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Dosi (2007)
SF14 Persistent productivity differential across firms Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Dosi (2007)
SF15 Lumpy investment rates at firm-level Doms and Dunne (1998)
SF16 Firm bankruptcies are counter-cyclical Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008)
SF17 Firm bad-debt distribution fits a power-law Di Guilmi et al. (2004)
Table 1: Stylized facts replicated by the K+S models.
and change in inventories.
4 Empirical validation
The K+S model can jointly account for a large number of macro and micro stylized facts. The
ability of the model to reproduce at the same time a wide set of empirical regularities, holding
the set of parameter values fixed, is a procedure that both empirically validates the model, and
disciplines the parametrization used in the simulation experiments (much more details on these
results in Dosi et al., 2010, 2013, 2015).
We briefly recall the micro- and macro regularities reproduced by the model in Table 1.
On the macroeconomic side, self-sustained growth is endogenously generated by the model (see
left plot in Figure 2) together with emergent business cycles (see the bandpass-filtered GDP,
right plot in Figure 2). Mild economic fluctuations are punctuated by deep downturns (Stiglitz,
2016). As a consequence, the GDP growth-rate distribution generated by the model exhibits
fat tails (cf. Figure 3) well in tune with the empirical evidence (Fagiolo et al., 2008).22 At
the business cycle frequencies, the relative volatility of fluctuations between output, investment
and consumption and the comovements between GDP and the main macroeconomic time series
are in line with the empirical evidence (for the empirics and discussion cf. Stock and Watson,
1999; Napoletano et al., 2006). In particular, aggregate R&D investment is pro-cyclical (see e.g.
Walde and Woitek, 2004).
22Note that DSGE models are not able to match such empirical regularities even if they are fed with fat-tailed
shocks (Ascari et al., 2015).
15
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
102
104
106
108
1010
1012
1014
Time
 
 
GDP
C
I
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Time
 
 
GDP
C
I
Figure 2: Model-generated GDP, consumption and investment time series.
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Figure 3: GDP growth-rate distribution. Simulated data vs. Normal fit.
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Furthermore, the model also matches the major business cycle stylized facts concerning credit
(Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Mendoza and Terrones, 2014) and banking crises (Laeven and
Valencia, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). In particular, credit booms lead to higher firm
default rates, which often trigger banking crises. The impact of banking crises on the public
budget is severe, much higher than those of “standard” recessions, and not limited to bailout
costs (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013).
Finally, the model is also able to replicate several microeconomic empirical regularities. Note
that the properties described herafter are emerging from the simulations; all firms are initialized
in the first period of the model with the same size and productivity level. To begin with, firms are
extremely heterogeneous in terms of size, growth rate and productivity: firm size distributions
are right skewed; firm growth-rate distributions are fat tailed; productivity differentials among
firms are persistent over time (see e.g. Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Dosi, 2007). Moreover, firms
invest in a lumpy fashion (Doms and Dunne, 1998).
Note that the capability of agent-based models to replicate both macro and micro stylized
facts is one of the major advantages vis-a`-vis DSGE ones, which by building on the fiction of
the representative agent cannot account for any meaningful heterogeneity at the microeconomic
level (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2016).
5 The impact of heterogeneous expectation formation rules
After having showed the explanatory capabilities of the K+S model in the baseline scenario
with na¨ıve expectations (NA), let us compare the performance of the economy under alternative
expectation formation scenarios. More specifically, we assess the impact of different expecta-
tion heuristics on variables capturing the long-run performance of the economy (average GDP
growth), as well as short-run fluctuations (output volatility, average unemployment rate, eco-
nomic crises - i.e. the likelihood of GDP drops higher than three percent). We also study the
forecast mistakes of firms in alternative expectation regimes, measured as follows:
Errorj(t) =
[
Dj(t)− (Dej (t) +N ej (t))
Dej (t) +N
e
j (t)
]2
, (18)
which include also expected inventories (N e).23 Then, we compute the mean squared forecast
error (MSFE), built by aggregating consumption-good firms’ demand forecast mistakes. Note
that MSFEs map directly into firms’ profitability, thus affecting their evolution and survival
probability. Indeed, the correlations between MSFEs and firms’ profit margins are significantly
negative, especially when they accumulate losses (see Table 2). If firms underestimate their
demands, they lose competitiveness and market shares, while in case of overproduction, they
have to pay wages and accumulate inventories without getting revenues.
The results of our Monte Carlo simulation analyses are presented in Table 3, where we
report, for all the variables, the ratio between alternative expectation rules and the baseline
23The expectation mistakes of consumption-good firms are computed at the end of the period, once realized
demand is observed. As they account also for expected inventories (Ne), firms with correct expectations make
no mistakes. Expectational errors are normalized to be independent from firms’ size. The MSFE is then the
Monte-Carlo average of the mean over all agents’ squared errors for all periods in each independent run.
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Avg. correlation Std. dev.
Unconditional -0.147 0.023
Conditional on firms with negative profits -0.758 0.021
Table 2: Average correlation between mean squared forecast errors and firms’ profits. Average
over 50 MC runs.
myopic heuristic (NA), and mean-difference t-tests. The first four scenarios (ADA, WTR, STR
and AA) assume that all the firms in the economy follow the same expectation rule. This allows
us to understand the forecast errors of each rule as well as their impact on the economic system,
independently of other heuristics.
The mean squared forecast errors reported in Table 3 are significantly different from zero
in all expectation scenarios (in line with a rich body of empirical evidence, see e.g. Coibion
and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Gennaioli et al., 2016). The MSFEs of myopic NA expectations are
significantly lower than those of most other heuristics (WTR, STR, AA), with the exception of
the adaptive expectation (ADA) regime (although not significantly different). Note, however,
that the quality of the forecasts of alternative expectations rules does not necessarily map into
the “goodness” of macroeconomic performances (cf. Table 3), as such another piece of evidence
on the lack of isomorphism between micro expectations/behaviors and system-level dynamics.
So, for example, with strong trend heuristics (STR), higher MSFEs translate into lower long-
run growth and higher short-run instability. This result is explained by the destabilizing role
in model dynamics of additional positive feedbacks resulting from STR rule (see e.g. Heemeijer
et al., 2009; Anufriev et al., 2013). Similarly, when firms take into account both their own
demand and GDP dynamics as in the AA case, both MSFEs and output volatility and the
likelihood of economic crises significantly increase.24 However, the MSFE of the weak trend rule
(WTR) is higher than those of myopic expectations, but the unemployment rate falls (while the
performance of other variables is not significantly different from the benchmark case). Finally,
with respect to the benchmark scenario, the adaptive expectation rule (ADA) reduces GDP
volatility and the likelihood of crises without increasing MSFEs.
24The worse performance of AA expectations is confirmed also when firms consider only GDP growth (waa = 1)
in forecasting their demand. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Expectation Avg. GDP GDP Unemployment Likelihood Mean squared
rules growth volatility rate of crises forecast error
Average value, NA
NA 0.030 0.042 0.047 0.066 0.072
Ratio wrt. NA
ADA 0.996 0.858** 1.304 0.611** 0.960
WTR 1.005 1.060 0.691* 1.049 1.842**
STR 0.966** 2.879** 2.341** 3.082** 7.731**
AA 1.000 1.563** 0.890 1.775** 1.321**
SWITCH 1.008 0.947 0.395** 0.765* 1.773**
Table 3: Expectation heuristics and macroeconomic performance. Average values in the
baseline (NA) and ratio with respect to the baseline, myopic expectations (NA). *: significant
difference wrt. baseline (NA) at 1% level (**) and 5% level (*).
Let us now consider the SWITCH scenario, where expectations are heterogeneous as agents
can switch across heuristics according to their past performance (cf. Section 3.3), thus “learning”
from experience. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the share of each heuristic followed by agents
over time. With the exception of the strong trend rule (STR), the share of the other heuristics is
similar and fluctuates around a relatively stable value: firms do not converge to a single dominant
expectation rule, but rather the system grows on an ecology of them. Such a result is robust
to different values of the parameters affecting firms’ choice of the expectation heuristic (cf. η, δ
and β, in Eqs. 11 and 12) and it is in line with the evidence of Coibion et al. (2015) supporting
the existence of persistently heterogeneous beliefs among firms. In presence of such an ecology
of expectation heuristics, the mean squared forecast errors are considerably and significantly
higher than in the benchmark myopic case (cf. Table 3). If agents try to improve their forecast
performance switching among different heuristics according to their past performance, they
indeed worsen it. the performance of the economy is not worse than the one observed under
the myopic (NA) rule: on the contrary, the unemployment rate and occurrence of crises are
significantly lower (see Table 3). Again, higher MSFEs do not appear to significantly affect the
performance of the economy: the unemployment rate and occurrence of crises are significantly
lower that those observed under myopic (NA) rule (see Table 3).
The first general conclusion from this battery of simulation exercises is that fast and frugal
heuristics can forecast better than more sophisticated rules (in line with the results in Gigeren-
zer and Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). Second, compared to the latter, more
sophisticated rules involving learning from experience (such as in the SWITCH regime) yield
worse forecasts. Third, such worsened individual performance, however, is not reflected by any
deterioration of the performance of the system: on the contrary, stochastic micro transitions
within ecologies of rules seem to somewhat stabilize it, thus possibly improving macroeconomic
dynamics. Of course, this lack of isomorphism between micro and aggregate behaviors witnesses
the illegitimacy of the use of any “representative agent” as explanatory device of macro dynamics
(all this fully in line with Kirman, 2010).
Finally, expectations do have some effect on the dynamics of the economy but not too much
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Figure 4: Average share of each expectation heuristic over time. Average over 50 simulations.
(see also Dosi et al., 2006). They are not the main drivers and source of fluctuations: rather,
income constraints appear to have a fundamental role and co-evolve with them. This is revealed
by the relative stable performance of the economy in different expectation scenarios. In the
exercises so far, agents just switch between fixed parameter heuristics. Let us now explore how
further increasing the sophistication of firms’ expectation formation process affects individual
and macroeconomic performance.
6 From heuristics to learning expectations
Let us now relax the assumption of common and stable parameters in the expectation heuristics
followed by firms, and make agents learn as if they were econometricians. While it is not possible
to implement forward-looking calculations in agent-based models because the latter follow the
arrow of time as the real world does (Macy and Flache, 2002), one may introduce a learning
process which tries to capture “a boundedly rational model of how rational expectations can
be achieved” (Evans and Honkapohja, 1999, p. 452). More specifically, agents are assumed to
predict their future demand estimating the parameter of their expectation rule via recursive
least squares (RLS, see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
We will introduce RLS learning in the adaptive expectation (ADA) scenario (cf. Section 5
above). In such a setting, the parameter (ωada) of the expectation heuristic now varies cross-
sectionally and over time, according to firms’ estimations over their own demand time series
(ωˆrls,j). As the ADA was the regime with the lowest mean squared forecast error, we will also
test whether RLS learning further reduces it vis-a`-vis heuristics rules. Together we shall assess
the impact of learning on macroeconomic dynamics. The results presented below also hold when
firms estimate the parameter of the trend expectation rule.25
In the RLS-learning adaptive expectations scenario, firms can now estimate Equation 7 by
25Under the RLS-learning scenario, the “weak” and “strong” trend rules collapse into a unique one.
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recursive least squares (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001):
Dj(t− 1)−Dej (t− 2) = const+ wrls,j(Dj(t− 2)−Dej (t− 2)) + (t), (19)
where the estimation sample size is between Tminrls = 5 and T
max
rls = 40 observations. To account
for agents’ limited memory, when the sample reaches the maximum size Tmaxrls , the firm replaces
the oldest observation with the newest one.26
Notice that the very presence of exit and entry processes leads to the joint presence of two
types of agents: heuristic-guided and sophisticated firms (Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985).27
The first type of firms are entrants, which cannot (yet) rely on past demand observations to
estimate wˆrls,j . In such a case, we assume that for the first periods, young firms follow a heuristic,
setting the parameter as in Equation 7 (i.e. ωˆrls,j = ωada = 0.65). Once incumbent firms gather
enough observations (Tminrls ), they become “sophisticated” and start performing RLS. Note that
the relative share of heuristic vs. sophisticated firms (which, as shown below, impacts both the
micro- and macroeconomic performance in the system) depends on entry and exit processes,
and on the minimum number of observations required to perform RLS (Tminrls ).
Further important insights can be gained by experimenting the evolutionary competition
between “adult” heuristic and RLS agents within the same environment. Thus, we check their
relative “fitness” proxied by, first, the revealed profitabilities of the two behavioural types, and,
second, their survival rates. In order to do that, when firms become old enough to perform
RLS regressions (i.e. 8-periods old in the benchmark case), they continue to be heuristic with
probability one half, or conversely become of the RLS type and start estimating their adaptive
parameter.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Sophisticated firms
Time
lo
g 
Sa
le
s
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Heuristic firms
Time
lo
g 
Sa
le
s
Figure 5: Evolution of the logarithm of sales of RLS agents (left) and heuristic-guided agents
(right) over one simulation run.
In terms of profitabilities, the greater forecasting errors make more sophisticated firms less
26After the estimation we bound the parameters such that ωˆrls,j,t ∈ [−2; 2]. The presented results are robust
also in the unbounded case.
27As pointed pointed out by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985), when there is a fraction of agents which have
no previous experience with a specific situation, learning does not converge to a rational expectation equilibrium.
Similarly, in our model, learning cannot jettison heuristic-guided firms from the economy.
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Expectation Avg. GDP GDP Unemployment Likelihood Mean squared
rules growth volatility rate of crises forecast error
Ratio wrt. to NA
ADA + RLS learning 0.961** 1.242** 4.553** 1.623** 7.529**
Ratio wrt. to ADA
ADA + RLS learning 0.965** 1.448** 3.492** 2.657** 7.847**
Table 4: Macroeconomic performance under RLS-learning ADA expectations, Tminrls = 5. Ratio
with respect to the baseline (NA, ADA). Average over 50 MC runs. Significant difference wrt.
baseline at 1% level (**) and 5% level (*).
profitable (see also Table 2). Conversely, median age at death of the two types are not statis-
tically different. Recall that firms die when either their market shares go to zero, or their net
worth become negative, so that also firms with negative profits survive as long as they have
a positive accumulated cash balances from the past. In addition, both types display means of
age at death much higher than the medians - as such evidence of a fat right-tail of firms which
happen to live much longer, either because they are technologically more competent or simply
luckier in their forecast and investment decisions. However, more “sophisticated” firms seem to
live a more precarious and marginal life. The volatility of their size is much higher (see Figure
5) and they represent 97% of the firms in the bottom decile of the market share distribution
(average over 50 Montecarlo runs). Finally, we experimented with different selection intensities
(proxied by the parameter χ governing the replicator equation, eq. 31 in the Appendix): as
the latter increases, the median and mean age at death of RLS agents falls faster than heuristic
ones.
In Table 4, we compare our target indicators under RLS learning in the adaptive expectation
scenario vis-a`-vis the baseline (myopic expectations, NA) as well as the simple heuristic ADA.
Simulation results show that RLS learning has both short- and long-run destabilizing effects
on macroeconomic dynamics, as it increases output volatility, the unemployment rate and the
likelihood of economic crises, while reducing average GDP growth.
Why does the introduction of RLS-learning considerably worsen the performance of the econ-
omy? Overall, firms make considerably larger forecasting mistakes (cf. Table 4, last column).28
Let us consider separately the mean squared demand forecast errors of heuristic-guided and
sophisticated agents. Table 5 presents such statistics. The surge in the MSFE is mainly driven
by sophisticated agents, whose errors are eight times larger than heuristic ones. Moreover, the
presence of sophisticated agents also inflates the forecast errors of heuristic-guided firms, from
0.069 to 0.082 (the relation between the relative share of the two types of firms and their MSFEs
will be further studied below).
What can explain the huge mistakes of sophisticated firms, and the consequent lower per-
formance of the RLS-learning scenario vis-a`-vis the myopic and ADA ones? There are two
alternative hypotheses. A straightforward explanation is simply that fast and frugal heuristic
28Note that when RLS-learning is introduced, the increases in MSFEs are much higher than the differences
across alternative heuristic-expectation scenarios. And this comes together with worse macroeconomic perfor-
mances.
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Expectation rule all agents sophisticated heuristic-guided
agents agents
NA 0.072 - -
ADA 0.069 - -
ADA + RLS learning 0.544 0.685 0.082
Table 5: Mean squared demand forecast errors under the different expectation scenarios. Aver-
age over 50 MC runs.
Figure 6: Cross-sectional performance across agents using different number of observations re-
quired to perform RLS. Left: Binned plot relating sample size and estimated coefficients. Right:
Binned plot relating sample size and demand forecast mistakes.
expectations outperform RLS-learning ones in an economic environment characterized by deep
uncertainty and technical change (in line with Heiner, 1983; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Bro¨der,
2003; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). In such a framework, heuristics can allow one to get
more accurate forecasts than complex procedures, because they are robust to changes in the
fundamentals of the economy. This is the less-is-more principle emerging when agents must
take decisions or form forecasts in complex environment (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). The
alternative hypothesis is that the larger forecast errors of sophisticated agents are due to an
insufficient number of observations employed in the estimations, and/or to the noise created by
heuristic-guided firms.
In order to test the latter interpretation, we begin by exploiting the cross-sectional het-
erogeneity in the size of the samples employed by the sophisticated agents to estimate their
expected demand. Indeed, depending on their age, firms rely on a variable number of observa-
tions bounded between Tminrls and T
max
rls . Figure 6 (left) shows that, as the size of the sample
increases and approaches Tmaxrls = 40, the estimates become more and more similar across firms,
but the demand forecast errors steadily rise (cf. Figure 6, right). This means that long-lasting
incumbents make larger mistakes than novel RLS-learning firms. This is a first indication that
more information does not yield more accuracy in such a setting.
We then consider whether the underperformance of sophisticated agents is due to the “noise”
created by heuristic-based ones. By tuning the parameter Tminrls , which defines the minimum
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Figure 7: Effect of changing the minimum number of observations to perform RLS, Tminrls .
Average over 50 MC runs.
number of observations required for RLS estimation, we exogenously change the relative share
of sophisticated and heuristic firms in the economy. Figure 7 (bottom, left) shows that the share
of RLS learners decreases from 79% to 20% as Tminrls rises from five to thirty. At the same time,
as more heuristic followers populate the economy, output volatility and the unemployment rate
steadily fall (see Figure 7, top row). Furthermore, the analysis of the MSFEs of the two types
of agents suggests that two effects are responsible for such improvement in the performance of
the economy (cf. Figure 7, bottom right). First, as heuristic agents make lower mistakes than
sophisticated ones, the increase in their relative share automatically reduces the average forecast
error, due to a sheer composition effect. At the same time, an interaction effect is at work, as both
types of agents (and especially the sophisticated ones) reduce their mistakes when the fraction
of sophisticated firms is lower. The RLS-learning firms turn out to be the source of noise as they
destabilize the forecasting performance of all agents. The model shows that the presence of firms
following simple heuristics stabilizes the economy. In contrast, the introduction of firms endowed
with sophisticated expectation “learning” decreases both individual and collective performance,
yielding more market turbulence, higher output volatility and unemployment, and lower long-run
growth.
The puny performance of expectations formed with RLS learning boils down to the fact that
it is not possible to bend complex, non-linear worlds into a linear framework. This is the case in
this model, and it is also the typical situation in contemporary economies where the stream of
innovations and the resulting perpetual structural change coevolve with Knightian uncertainty,
making the typical econometric tools employed in standard macroeconomics (see e.g. Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001) useless or even misleading. In such a framework, the less-is-more principle
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holds (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009) and more information deteriorates the quality of the fore-
casts (cf. Figure 6, see also Geanakoplos, 1992). Indeed, in line with Box and Jenkins (1976),
more sophisticated models, even when they fit better the data, are worse predictors. Thus, in a
complex evolving economy, the adoption of fast and frugal heuristics is the “rational” response of
agents (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009), and regulators and policy
makers too (Haldane, 2012).
7 Structural breaks, uncertainty and expectations
In order to provide further support to this conclusion, we perform two additional sets of experi-
ments. First, we study how RLS-learning expectations fare in an environment presenting a lower
level of uncertainty and complexity (low-innovation regime). This first robustness test will allow
us to evaluate the concept of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer and
Selten, 2002), i.e. expectation rules may perform differently depending on the environment. As
discussed above, the poor performance of the RLS-learning rule might be related to the complex
evolving nature of the environment, as driven by innovation leaps. It follows that such result
might be affected by an exogenous change in the size and frequency of innovation leaps.
Second, we allow RLS learners to choose whether they want to use the heuristic or the
sophisticated rule, either based on their relative performance (choosing-RLS scenario), or due
to the presence of structural breaks that could affect the results of their estimation (structural-
break regime). Indeed, “smarter” agents than the RLS-learners might be able to detect when to
use RLS-learning and when to choose heuristics, depending on their relative fitness.
We exogenously reduce the uncertainty and complexity of the environment by limiting the
Schumpeterian engine of the K+S model, scaling down the frequency and magnitude of the
micro-shocks that characterize the innovation process. More specifically, we consider a low-
innovation scenario where both firm search capabilities and technological opportunities are lower
with respect to the baseline parametrization (see Section 3.2, Appendix B and the experiments
in Dosi et al., 2010).29 Let us compare the performance of the economy under the baseline and
the low-innovation regimes under the ADA and ADA + RLS expectation formation. The results
are presented in Table 6. Irrespectively of the mechanisms of expectation formation, slowing
down the Schumpeterian engine negatively affects both the short- and long-run performance
of the economy (in accordance with Dosi et al., 2010) (see Table 6, first row). Interestingly,
and somewhat puzzlingly, under the low innovation regime the economy seems to become more
volatile. Put the other way round, it seems that, other things being equal, the stronger the
innovative drive of the economy, the higher the rate of growth of the economy and the lower
its volatility. Conversely, with a milder innovative push the coordination hurdles become more
pronounced30
29The parameters impacting search capabilities in the innovation and imitation processes (ζ1 and ζ2), are
reduced from 0.3 to 0.05, and the Beta distribution governing technological opportunities is modified from a
Beta(3, 3) to a Beta(2.7, 3.3).
30This is what in another work (Dosi and Virgillito, 2017), one caricaturally calls “the bicycle theorem”: it is
much easier to stand up when you steadily cycle...
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Expectation Avg. GDP GDP Unemployment Likelihood Mean squared
rules growth volatility rate of crises forecast error
Ratio wrt to ADA
ADA, low-innovation regime 0.541** 1.211** 1.365** 2.896** 1.128**
Ratio wrt ADA+RLS
ADA+RLS, low-innovation regime 0.542** 0.967** 0.687** 1.261** 0.830**
Table 6: Effect of low-innovation regime. Ratio with respect to the benchmark Schumpeterian
regime. Significant difference wrt. baseline at 1% level (**) and 5% level (*).
Equally interestingly, under the low-innovation regime, when firms adopt RLS-learning ex-
pectations, the short-run performance of the economy improves, rendering it less volatile (even
if it grows at a lower rate, see Table 6, second row). This comes from the fact that in a less com-
plex environment, recursive least squares work relatively better, resulting also in a significantly
lower MSFE. In particular, the demand forecast errors of sophisticated firms fall (from 0.69 to
0.58 on average), more than compensating the surge in output volatility and unemployment due
to the feebler process of technical change.
The conclusion of the foregoing exercise is that the performance of RLS-learning expectations
is improved if the economy is less subject to innovation shocks, and is thus more predictable.
This result corroborates the notion that expectation rules can only be assessed in relation to the
features of the environment where they are formed, as argued by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999).
What happens instead if firms try to account for the relative accuracy of the heuristic
and RLS-learning expectations, or if they account for structural breaks when they select their
forecasting rules?
In the choosing-RLS scenario, we allow firms to choose between the heuristic and sophisti-
cated expectation rules, on the basis of the comparison of the ex-post MSFEs of the two rules in
the previous period. Simulation results show that agents rationally choose to follow heuristics
most of the time. Indeed, in 56% of cases, firms decide not to employ RLS, reducing the popu-
lation of RLS-learning agents from 79% to 31%.31 As a consequence, the mean squared forecast
error considerably contracts and the performance of the economy improves (i.e. higher GDP
growth, lower GDP volatility, unemployment rate and likelihood of crises than in the ADA+RLS
scenario; cf. Table 7, first row).
Furthermore, as RLS learning assumes a linear relationship between past and future indi-
vidual performance, it is inadequate if the relationship under study is characterized by sudden
changes and breaks (more on that in Hendry and Mizon, 2010). In the structural-break scenario,
we allow firms to decide whether or not to use RLS expectations after performing a Chow test
for structural breaks. More specifically, once a firm has accumulated enough past observations
(T chowrls = 24), it performs a Chow test, dividing the most recent T
chow
rls observations into two
equal subsamples. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of structural stability, the agent ratio-
nally chooses to revert to the heuristic rule. If no structural break is found, it keeps on with
RLS-learning expectations. We find that the Chow test does not accept the null hypothesis 25%
31More detailed simulation results are available from the authors upon request.
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Expectation Avg. GDP GDP Unemployment Likelihood Mean squared
rules growth volatility rate of crises forecast error
Ratio wrt ADA+RLS
ADA+RLS cum choosing-RLS 1.038** 0.641** 0.185** 0.284** 0.119**
Ratio wrt to ADA
ADA+RLS and structural break test 0.978** 1.021 1.974** 1.209* 3.517**
Ratio wrt ADA+RLS
ADA+RLS and structural break test 1.014* 0.705** 0.565** 0.455** 0.448**
Table 7: Effect of choosing between the heuristic and sophisticated rules. Ratio with respect to
the ADA regime with RLS learning. Significant difference wrt. baseline at 1% level (**) and
5% level (*).
of the times, resulting in a lower share of sophisticated agents in the system (on average, 56%
of firms perform RLS, against 79% when the Chow test was not present). As a consequence,
when firms can “rationally choose” to switch to heuristics when they detect a structural break,
the relative MSFE falls and all the macroeconomic indicators improve (see the last row in Table
7). However, in such a case, even if firms can employ sophisticated econometric procedures,
the short- and long-run performance of the economy is still worse than when fast and frugal
adaptive heuristic rules are employed (see Table 7, second row)! Our findings, again, confirm
that in an uncertain, complex world, characterized by frequent structural breaks, “less-is-more
procedures” lead to more accurate forecasts and heuristic expectations are rational (Gigerenzer
and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009).
8 “Real-Business-Cycle” agents: supply-driven expectation dy-
namics
Throughout the work, we have modelled agents - no matter the expectation rules - as somewhat
“Keynesian”, in that the object of their expectation is basically demand and, based on that,
they compute their desired investment. Relatedly, we have explored the impact of different
degrees of “sophistication” and “rationality” in such demand forecasting attempts. In this
last exercise we turn to a different, even more radical, approach to supposedly increase the
rationality of firms. We assume that consumption-good firms take their desired production and
investment decisions by always forecasting a demand level corresponding to their full capacity
utilization. In addition, they perfectly foresight the rate of potential productivity growth, as
determined by productivity shocks in the capital-good sector. Notice that the latter assumption
is possible because, although productivity shocks are endogenous and idiosyncratic in the model,
their realizations are known before production and investment in the consumption-good sector
take place. The foregoing assumptions are equivalent to a framework in which - from the
viewpoint of agents’ expectations - the economy is fully supply-driven. Notice that this is also
the typical situation in Real Business Cycle (RBC) models (see King and Rebelo, 1999, as well
as the barebone of New Keynesian DSGE models), where the economy is always at full capacity
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Expectation Avg. GDP GDP Unempl. Likelihood
rules growth volatility rate of crises
Ratio wrt to NA
RBC agents (no inventories) 0.815** 3.658** 2.765** 2.390**
RBC agents (inventories) 0.894** 3.125** 3.059** 2.444**
Table 8: Effect of RBC agents. Ratio with respect to the baseline (NA). Significant difference
wrt. baseline at 1% level (**) and 5% level (*).
utilization and the dynamics is entirely driven by aggregate productivity shocks. For this reason,
we label agents in this economy “RBC agents”.
We implement the notion in two different scenarios. In the first one (“no inventories” sce-
nario), consumption-good firms do not consider inventories, and they set their desired production
to a level equal to their productive capacity:
RBC agents (no inventories): Qdj (t) = Kj(t). (20)
In the second scenario (“inventories” scenario), firms account for the feedback from demand on
production by adjusting downwards their desired production in presence of inventories inherited
from the past period:
RBC agents (inventories): Qdj (t) = Kj(t)−Nj(t− 1). (21)
Moreover, in the model used in the paper, consumption-good firms define their desired capital
based on desired production and the capacity utilization rate u as follows:
Baseline: Kdj (t) =
Qdj (t)
u
, (22)
with u=0.75. We assume that RBC agents define their desired production by adjusting their
current level of capital to the potential aggregate productivity growth in the capital-good sector,
Apotential1 (t):
RBC agents: Kdj (t) =
Qdj (t)
u
∗ (1 +Apotential1 (t)), (23)
where Apotential1 (t) is the weighted average of productivity growth in the capital-good sector.
Table 8 presents the aggregate indicators for these two experiments, compared to our bench-
mark myopic expectations scenario (NA). The differences with respect to the baseline are
dramatic. In the scenario without inventories, 45% of simulations end in a collapse of the
consumption-good sector (100% of failures, in which case the simulations are stopped). In the
remaining simulations, the economy performs significantly worse than in the baseline, both in
the long-term (lower GDP growth) as well as in the short-term (higher GDP volatility, unem-
ployment and crises). In the second scenario, with inventories, an indirect feedback from lack of
demand to production and investment is added. Yet, the aggregate performance of the economy
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Figure 8: Distribution of demand forecast mistake with RBC agents, scenario without invento-
ries. Left: NA; Right: RBC, no inventories. Average over 50 MC runs. The forecasting errors are
not squared in order to emphasize over-production (negative values) as well as under-production
(positive-values).
does not improve much.
How can one explain the significantly worse performance of the economy in presence of RBC
agents? In a world without income constraints, having all firms coordinating their demand
expectations on full-capacity utilization levels would be enough for the achievement of a full-
employment-full-capacity state at the aggregate level. This is not the case in this model, where
income constraints arise both from uncertainty in the distribution of demand across firms and
from financial market imperfections limiting the investment and consumption of, respectively,
firms and households. In particular, the possibility that some firms are credit rationed implies
in general that actual aggregate investment will be lower than desired aggregate investment.
In its turn, lower rates of actual investment map into lower levels of employment and of final
consumption demand. The result is that many RBC firms will end up over-producing, accu-
mulating inventories, and making losses. The neglect of these endogenous demand effects by
RBC agents is revealed by the analysis of the distribution of their forecast errors (see Figure 8,
right plot), whose mass is much more skewed to the left compared to the baseline (see Figure
8, left plot). These over-production mistakes are further amplified in the model via the adverse
effects that bankruptcy has on the supply of credit to firms. Indeed, persistent accumulation of
inventories and losses will map into higher rates of bankruptcy. This results in higher rates of
bad debt that reduce banks’ net worth, and in turn, the available supply of credit.
In conclusion, the above analysis is a robust confutation of the standard “supply-side model”.
In fact, RBC agents are “right” on the supply side part of the model and on their structural
understanding of the stochastic productivity process. Yet, the overall impact is largely negative
because they neglect the “Keynesian” endogeneity of demand. Notice that the results strengthen
the notion that financial market imperfections play a key role in generating aggregate coordina-
tion failures (see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993).
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9 The properties of heuristic-driven decisions
It is crucial to emphasize that in complex evolving worlds, even the analyst, as well as any agent
with the same knowledge of the analyst, with the “true” model of the world, would not do any
better than the “heuristic agent”. Consider the “analyst” who happens to be the “constructor”
of the world, that is us authors of the model: we “know” the true model and we can simulate
it up to time t. Are we able to predict what a state variable will be, say demand, of agent i
at time t + 1, better than any heuristic agent? The answer, which is quite revolutionary, is in
general negative. Of course we would be very good at “predicting the past” - as Balzac once
wrote -, that is in fitting, but probably poor in forecasting.
To see this, recall that the model is a very high dimensional system: in its bare-bone struc-
ture, it has N1+N2 firms, hit by endogenously-generated idiosyncratic shocks (capital-embodied
productivity improvements) which affect the competitiveness of the firms via their unit costs,
and through that, the dynamics of the market shares and survival probabilities. Therefore, the
minimum dimensionality of the system is (N1 +N2)× c (i.e the number of control variables of
each firm) ×s (the system-level state variables). Furthermore, besides being high dimensional,
the system is also highly non-linear.
First, micro technological shocks painstakingly propagate in the economic system. Second,
different degrees of competitiveness introduce system-level correlations in the dynamics of firms’
market shares. Third, of course, there is yet another Keynesian system-level correlation, because
the individual demands are the market shares multiplied by the size of the whole market, but
the latter (endogenously) sums up over all employed workers multiplied by their wages. Fourth,
pervasive financial imperfections imply that firms can be constrained in their production and
investment decisions by the credit supply of banks, which endogenously evolve according to their
equities, possibly leading to emergent banking crises, leading to deep downturns. The emerging
outcome is a system which, at the level of the individual components - that is, the firms that
make decisions - is a combination between some complex non-linear dynamics and seemingly
random walks.
Here, it is fundamental to track the sources of prediction errors. As formalized by Gigerenzer
and his colleagues (within a long tradition in the learning literature), total forecast errors,
averaged across all possible data samples of a given size, can be written as:
total forecast error = (bias)2 + variance + noise,
“The bias is defined as the difference between the true underlying function and the
mean function, derived from the estimating algorithm. Thus, a zero bias is achieved
if the mean function induced by the algorithm is precisely the underlying function.
Variance captures how sensitive the induction algorithm is to the content of these
individual samples, and is defined as the sum of the square differences between
the mean functions and the individual functions induced from each of the samples”
(Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, p. 117).
Thus, even in a stationary world, “an unbiased algorithm may suffer from high variance
because the mean function may be precisely the underlying function, but the individual functions
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may suffer from excess variance and hence high errors” (ibid). And agents, in the real world,
only observe one sample path, their own history. Moreover, in our case, the point is further
exacerbated by the intrinsic non-stationarity and non-linearity of the world as a whole, and of
the fate of each agent in such environments. Indeed, most likely (individual) dynamics diverge.
We are not able yet to dissect non-linear deterministic processes vs. the seemingly stochastic
components. However, the ontology of our world is fully opposite to those who claim agents
can learn “rational expectations” (see Marcet and Sargent, 1989). On the contrary, the world is
too complex, and too much changing, in order to be able to learn its fine structure, let alone its
parameters. Thus, there is in most cases of complex environments, no accuracy/efforts trade-offs
in information gathering. In such a framework, heuristics outperform OLS learning in forecasting
because their forecast are certainly biased as compared to those which an omniscient Laplacian
God would make, but have a much lower variance than those which finite agents could make on
the grounds of all their available information.
10 Concluding remarks
In this work we have extended the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) family of models to account
for the impact of heterogeneous expectations and learning processes on the performance of the
economy. In particular, firms can forecast their future demand either by choosing among an
ensemble of different heuristics or via recursive least square estimations.
Simulation results show that under alternative heuristics, significantly different mean squared
forecast errors do not considerably affect macroeconomic performance (below a certain thresh-
old). This invariance suggests the relative minor role of expectations in environments where
income constraints largely drive the dynamics of the economy. Furthermore, none of the heuris-
tic rules disappear from the market, in line with the evidence of persistent heterogeneity in firms’
beliefs (see Coibion et al., 2015).
However, when “sophisticated” firms are allowed to estimate their future demand via re-
cursive least squares, expectations do matter. And they matter for the worse: their forecast
errors skyrocket and the performance of the economy significantly worsens. In addition, agents
“rationally” choose heuristics vis-a`-vis RLS-learning of expectations whenever they are allowed
to select among the two. The conclusion is that heuristics should not be considered as a second-
best approximation, trading-off accuracy for effort in presence of cognitive limitations and biases.
Instead, the less-is-more principle holds, and “[we] can rely on heuristics because they are accu-
rate, not because they require less effort at the cost of some accuracy” (Gigerenzer and Brighton,
2009, p. 135).
Why does RLS learning spectacularly fail in the K+S model? The huge forecast errors made
by RLS-learning firms come from the fact that it is not possible to bend complex, non-linear
worlds into a linear econometric framework. By the same token, trying to bend a world that
is intrinsically keynesian, into a fully supply side one - alike RBC and DSGE - worsens both
individual and aggregate performances. In presence of imperfect information (Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1986), deep uncertainty (Knight, 1921) and technical change, the best “evolutionary”
response of firms seem to be the adoption of heuristics. “Fast and frugal” heuristics perform
relatively better in more uncertain settings, with large innovation leaps and structural breaks.
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The ecological rationality of heuristics (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002)
thus appears to be an emergent property in complex evolving economies, captured by the K+S
model. If the rationality of decision rules is evaluated according to their ability to reach their
goal given the environment, rather than by their use of more information, computation and time
(Bro¨der, 2003), then our results suggest that robust heuristic expectations are indeed “rational”.
In contemporary macroeconomic theory the role of expectations has been almost certainly
overstated. For sure expectations matter in influencing business cycle dynamics - in the real
world and also in the K+S family of models, but they are not the main source of fluctuations.
Other, more fundamental mechanisms such as firms’ heterogeneous innovation performance,
productivity dynamics and financial conditions (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993) interact with de-
mand expectations to trigger growth waves, avalanches of bankruptcies, as well as mild and deep
recessions (Stiglitz, 2011, 2016). In all that, simple and robust heuristics may not only be better
in terms of performance of individual agents, but turn out to be also a source of predictability
of behaviors (Heiner, 1983), and a “collective stabilizer”, allowing for easier coordination among
heterogeneous interacting agents.
There are different ways forward in this research path. One of them, and a very challenging
one indeed, is to contribute to the current debate about the robustness of macroeconomic policy
across different expectation frameworks. One way to do it would be to employ the K+S model
with alternative heuristic expectations to study the impact of different combinations of monetary
and fiscal policies (e.g. as in Dosi et al., 2015, 2016b), finally pushing the policy analysis beyond
and away from the dire straits of the “Lucas critique”.
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A Parameters
Description Symbol Value
Benchmark parameters
Montecarlo replications MC 50
Time sample T 600
Number of firms in capital-good industry F1 50
Number of firms in consumption-good industry F2 200
Number of banks B 10
Capital-good firms’ mark-up µ1 0.04
Consumption-good firm initial mark-up µ0 0.20
Banks deposits interest rate mark-up rD −1
Banks reserve interest rate mark-up µres −0.33
Bond interest rate mark-up µbonds 0
Loan interest rate mark-up µdeb 0.30
Bank capital adequacy rate τ b 0.08
Wage setting ∆AB weight ψ1 1
Wage setting ∆cpi weight ψ2 0.05
Wage setting ∆U weight ψ3 0.05
Shape parameter of bank client distribution paretoa 0.08
Desired inventories ι 0.10
Beta distribution parameters (innovation process) (α1, β1) (3,3)
Firm search capabilities parameters ζ1,2 0.30
Policy parameters
Inflation adjustment parameter (TRpi) γpi 1.10
Target interest rate rT 0.025
Target inflation rate piT 0.02
Tax rate tr 0.10
Unemployment subsidy rate ϕ 0.40
Expectation parameters
ADA adjustment wada 0.65
WTR adjustment wwtr 0.4
STR adjustment wstr 1.3
LAA adjustment waa 0.5
Memory parameter η 0.7
Intensity of choice β 0.4
Inertia parameter δ 0.9
Table 9: Parameters
B The K+S Model
In this appendix we present the full formal structure of the model described in Section 3. We detail the equations
characterising the decision rules in the capital- and consumption-good industries and we elaborate on the rules
governing the firm-bank interactions. The model is stock-flow consistent. More details can be found in Dosi et al.
(2015).
The capital- and consumption-good industries, complements
The capital-good industry
The technology of capital-good firms (identified with the subscript i) is defined by their labour productivity Bτi
and that of the machine they sell to the consumption-good sector firms Aτi , wihere τ is the technology vintage.
Their price is then defined by applying a fixed mark-up (µ1 > 0) on their unit cost of production c. The latter is
computed as ci(t) =
w(t)
Bτi
, where w(t) is the nominal wage.
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Both types of productivity (Bτi and A
τ
i ) evolve as an outcome of (costly) innovation and imitation, which
require capital-good firms to invest in R&D. The value of R&D expenses (equally split between innovation INi
and imitation IMi) is defined by a simple heuristic: it is a fixed share of past sales ν = 0.04. Innovation is risky:
not all firms innovate, and the resulting innovation may be unsuccessful. The probability to innovate is defined by
a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution of parameter θini (t) = 1− e−ζ1INi(t), with ζ1 6 1, and increases with
the amount of R&D allocated to innovation (INi). Conditional on innovating, the firm draws a new technology
with the following characteristics:
Aini (t) = Ai(t)(1 + x
A
i (t))
Bini (t) = Bi(t)(1 + x
B
i (t)),
where xAi and x
B
i are two independent draws from a Beta(α1, β1) distribution over the support [x1, x1] with
x1 ∈ [−1, 0] and x1 ∈ [0, 1]. As discussed in Section 3, and shown in Section 6, α1 and β1 impact the technological
opportunities of capital-good firms.
Similarly, access to imitation depends on imitation expenses IMi, such that the probability to imitate follows
a Bernoulli draw (θimi (t) = 1−e−ζ2IMi(t)). Conditional on imitation, the firm copies the technology from another
incumbent firm, chosen in consideration with its technological distance from the imitating firm (in Euclidean
terms), and obtains the new values Aimi (t) and B
im
i (t). The firm chooses between its current (τ) and new
technology (obtained from innovation or imitation) as follows:
min
[
phi (t) + bc
h(Ahi (t))
]
, h = τ, in, im, (24)
where b = 3 is the payback period parameter (see Eq. 27 below). Once the productivity of their current product
is defined, capital-good firms seek customers by sending information about their machine’s price and productivity
to a subset of consumption-good firms. Thus the latter have imperfect information about the available machines
on the market. This subset includes their historical clients (HCi) and a random sample of potential new clients
NCi(t) = $HCi(t), with $ = 0.5.
The consumption-good industry
Consumption-good firms (identified with the subscript j) produce a homogeneous good using labor and capi-
tal under constant returns to scale. They define their desired level of production Qdj using adaptive demand
expectations Dej = f(Dj(t− 1), Dj(t− 2), . . . , Dj,t−h), desired inventories (Ndj ) and stock of inventories (Nj):
Qdj (t) = D
e
j (t) +N
d
j (t)−Nj(t− 1), (25)
with Ndj (t) = ιD
e
j (t), ι ∈ [0, 1]. Such desired level of production is associated with a desired capital stock (Kdj ).
If needed, they thus have to expand their current capital stock (Kj) through (desired) expansionary investment
(EIdj ):
32
EIdj (t) = K
d
j (t)−Kj(t). (26)
Besides expansionary investment, consumption-good firms may have to invest in order to replace old (of age> η
periods, η = 20) or obsolete machines, considering new machines’ prices. Indeed, the stock of capital comprises
different vintages of machines, each with different productivity Aτi ∈ Ξj (the productivity associated with their
supplier i when they bought the machine). Machines are scrapped according to the following payback routine:
RSj(t) =
{
Aτi ∈ Ξj(t) : p
∗(t)
c(Aτi (t))− c∗(t)
≤ b
}
, (27)
where p∗ and c∗ are the price and unit cost of production of new machines. The unit labour cost associated with
the machine of vintage τ is c(Aτi , t) =
w(t)
Aτi
. Replacement investment aggregates at firm level the number of old
32Such expansionary investment is limited by a fixed maximum threshold, as found in the empirical literature
on firm investment patterns (e.g. Doms and Dunne, 1998).
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machines and those satisfying Equation 27. Finally, the actual level of investment will depend on firms’ ability
to use internal finance, or obtain external finance (see below).
Consumption-good firms’ price is chosen by applying a variable mark-up (µj) on unit costs of production
(cj):
pj(t) = (1 + µj(t))cj(t). (28)
where the unit cost at the firm level cj(t) is the average over all their current machines.
The variable mark-up is adjusted with respect to the evolution of firms’ market shares (fj), where market
share expansion allows firms to apply a higher mark-up:33
µj(t) = µj(t− 1)
(
1 + υ
fj(t− 1)− fj(t− 2)
fj(t− 2)
)
, (29)
with υ = 0.01.
Given the heterogeneous price but homogeneous good, do all final-good consumers switch to the cheapest
supplier? This is not the case because they have imperfect information regarding the available prices (see Rotem-
berg, 2008). Still, market shares are positively associated with consumption-good firms’ competitiveness (Ej),
which reflects both their price and their amount of unfilled demand (lj) as inherited from the previous period:
Ej(t) = −pj(t)− lj(t), (30)
where the unfilled demand lj(t) is the difference between actual demand and production of the period. A firm’s
market share is then driven by its relative competitiveness compared to the weighted average (E),34 following a
“quasi” replicator dynamics:
fj(t) = fj(t− 1)
(
1− χEj(t)− E(t)
E(t)
)
, (31)
with χ = 1.
The banking sector, complements
Consumption-good firms can access credit to finance their production and investment from B commercial banks
(identified with the subscript k), so that they are proportional to the number of firms in the downstream sector:
B = F2
a
, with a = 20.35 Each firm is paired with a bank for the entire simulation, so that the distribution of
banks’ number of clients follows a power law of parameter α = 0.08, reflecting the empirical descriptions in Berger
et al. (1995); Ennis (2001). We identify a bank’s portfolio of clients Clk, with clients listed as cl = 1, ..., Clk.
Credit quantity
Besides the initial heterogeneity in terms of number of clients, banks endogenously evolve and grow apart in terms
of their supply of credit and balance sheet characteristics. More precisely, credit supply is constrained by capital
adequacy requirements inspired by Basel-framework rules (see e.g. Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Ashraf et al., 2017;
Raberto et al., 2012). The regulatory limit depends on banks’ equity in the previous period (NW bk (t − 1)). In
addition to the mandatory level of capital, we assume, following the empirical evidence (BIS, 1999), that banks
maintain a counter-cyclical buffer over the regulatory limit. The latter depends on their financial fragility, defined
by their past leverage Levk(t− 1) (the accumulated bad debt to assets ratio). Credit supply is set as:
TCk(t) =
NW bk (t− 1)
τ b(1 + Levk(t− 1)) , (32)
33As based on “customer market” models, see Phelps and Winter (1970).
34It is computed using the market shares of the previous period: E(t) =
F2∑
j=1
Ej(t)fj(t− 1).
35Capital-good firms do not need credit because they are paid in advance, before production starts, and do
not invest. a can be taken as a proxy for the level of competition in the banking market and is set according to
the empirical literature on topologies of credit markets (e.g. De Masi and Gallegati, 2007; De Masi et al., 2010).
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with macroprudential parameter τ b = 0.08. Banks’ availability of credit thus depends on the negative shocks to
their balance sheet (from clients’ past defaults, see below) as well as the regulatory environment, common to all
banks.
After banks have defined their supply f credit, and consumption-good firms their demand for loans (see above),
the allocation of credit is based on a pecking-order basis, where loan applicants are ranked according to a proxy
for their credit-worthiness (their past net worth to sales ratio (
NWj(t−1)
Sj(t−1) ). Banks allocate credit to firms until
they run out of funds or they satisfy all their applicants’ needs. Credit rationing emerges as a consequence of a
firm’s low ranking (ie. firms’ low credit-worthiness) or the bank’s low availability of credit (ie. banks’ financial
fragility or tight macroprudential framework).
Interest rates
The interest rates on loans rdebj paid by a particular firm depends on i) the central bank base rate r, ii) a
(homogeneous) bank mark-up and iii) a firm-specific risk permium. The base rate is fixed in each period according
to a conservative Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), targeting inflation:
r(t) = rT + γpi(pi(t)− piT ), γpi = 1.1 (33)
where pi(t) is the inflation rate of the period, rT = 0.025 is the target interest rate and piT = 0.02 is the inflation
target.36
Firms’ risk premium depends on their credit class, which corresponds to the quartiles q of the distribution of
their bank’s ranking of applicants. The loan rate is thus:
rdebj (t) = (1 + µ
deb)r(t) (1 + (q − 1)kconst) q = 1, 2, 3, 4 (34)
with µdeb = 0.3 the bank mark-up, and kconst = 0.1 a scaling parameter.
Besides revenues on interest on loans, banks receive interest on their stock of sovereign debt bonds at the
rate rbonds(t) = r(t)37 and on their stock of reserves at the central bank at the rate rres(t) = (1 + µres)r(t), with
µres = −0.33.
Bank net worth, failure and bailout policies
As described above, the evolution of banks’ balance sheets has an important impact on credit. Bank profits (Πbk)
evolve as follows:
Πbk(t) =
Clk∑
cl=1
rdebcl (t)Debcl(t) + r
resCashk(t) + r
bonds(t)Bondsk(t)− rDDepk(t)−BadDebtk(t) (35)
where Debcl is the stock of debt of client cl, Cashk are the liquidities of the bank, Bondsk is the stock of sovereign
bonds, and BadDebtk the non-performing loans of the period. The latter correspond to the stock of debt of clients
of the bank which exit the market. Banks then pay taxes on their positive profits at the rate tr = 0.1. Note that
profits ca be negative if loan losses are important.
Banks’ net worth are adjusted for the new net profits as follows:
NW bk (t) = Loansk(t) + Cashk(t) +Bondsk(t)−Depok(t) +NetΠbk(t) (36)
where Loansk(t) is the stock of loans and Depok(t) clients’ deposits.
A bank goes bankrupt if its net worth turns negative (due to important loan losses). When this happens, the
Government always intervenes to bail banks out and provides fresh capital, of amount Gbailoutk. The size of the
saved bank is set as a fraction of the smallest incumbent’s equity, provided it respects the capital adequacy ratio.
36See experiments on various Taylor rules in Dosi et al. (2015).
37See alternative rules for the setting of sovereign debt bonds in Dosi et al. (2015).
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